A Multidisciplinary Conference on the Identification and Tracking of Human Individuals
17-18 and 20-21 June 2011, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Philosophy, University of Sydney
On Wednesday 23 March 2011, by
Peter Carruthers, and some other theorists, argue that self-knowledge depends on the application to oneself of a theory-of-mind capacity. One great advantage of Carruthers’ view is that it dispenses with an inner sense and relies on cognitive machinery that we have independent reason to posit. But this approach cannot account for all the contexts in which we acquire knowledge of our attitudes. To cover all the phenomena we need to recognise the importance of Evans and Moran’s transparency theory of introspection. I will defend the transparency theory against some objections and suggest that the transparency theory also relies on existing cognitive machinery. The moral, I argue, is that there is no such thing as a faculty of introspection, but rather that self-knowledge depends on putting existing cognitive machinery to distinctive uses.
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